This article differentiates between clientelist (Thailand and the Philippines) and cleavagebased parties and party systems (Malaysia and Indonesia) with reference to insights of historical institutionalism. Clientelist parties, in contrast to cleavage-based ones, often undermine democratization because, on average, representativeness is weak, bureaucracy is more politicized, and rent-seeking behavior is widespread.
Introduction
What kind of parties and party systems exist in Southeast Asia? What are the major differences between them and how can we theoretically conceptualize these types? One possibility is to employ a sociological approach that explains differences with reference to deep-seated social structures that have a marked impact on party politics. The best-known model in the wide literature on political parties is the cleavage approach by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) . In a path-breaking article in 1967, they compared Western European party systems with a focus on critical junctures and path dependencies of major conflicts and patterns of political party oppositions. This paper has since triggered thousands of articles on cleavages within party systems around the world. Yet, the literature on party politics in Southeast Asia is not much affected by the work of Lipset and Rokkan. On the one hand, this has to do with the peculiar characteristics of parties and party systems in the region. On the other, it is connected to the theoretical weaknesses in this research field.
Party systems in Cambodia and Singapore (and, of course, Vietnam) are so strongly dominated by one party that the cleavage approach is almost irrelevant. This was also true for East Timor until the 2007 elections when the Fretilin (Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente) lost its hegemonic position. Yet, it is too early to draw elaborate conclusions about cleavage patterns, as the now-discernible regional divisions are still fairly new. 2 Therefore, the focus is on Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, all of which are characterized by multi-party systems with competitive elections, although regime types vary 2 The party system is now marked by a strong regional cleavage between Firaku and Kaladi -those living in the Eastern or Western part, respectively. This cleavage is not based on religious or ethnic differences, but likely has economic roots since Firaku enjoy advantages in the distribution of government jobs, particularly in the military.
to a certain degree between electoral democracy (Indonesia since 1999 and, for a long time, the Philippines and Thailand) and electoral authoritarianism (Malaysia).
This article assumes that the representativeness of government in most cases rises when party system structures reflect social diversities. The argument here is that clientelist parties, in contrast to cleavage-based ones, have the potential to stall democracy or to undermine democratic consolidation because, on average, accountability is eroded, cynicism is higher, bureaucracy is more politicized, and electoral volatility is higher as are rent-seeking and corruption. 3 But it has to be noted that cleavage-based party systems are not necessarily more democratic. 4 In Malaysia, this form of rootedness even has some contradictory effects because 'primordial' (ethnic and religious) conflicts have been manipulated by the regime to stabilize authoritarianism. 5 It is only the "status quo" versus "Reformasi" cleavage that can result in the 3 Allen Hicken, "Clientelism," Annual Review of Political Science 14 (2011), pp. 302ff. 4 Moreover, "a highly institutionalized party system -an institutional arrangement that analysts consider valuable for democratic consolidation and policy continuity -may emerge from the shell of undemocratic 
The Lipset/Rokkan Model and Critical Junctures
The cleavage model by Lipset and Rokkan provides a basis for a historically oriented sociological comparison of party systems in Western European democracies. Cleavages arise from fundamental social conflicts. They structure the discourse regarding major political questions, and as a consequence shape the patterns of the party system. Political actors and political parties institutionalize cleavages. Politicized cleavages are manifested as voter behavior, and as party platforms, policies, and party symbolism. The cleavage structure results from the complex relations of crosscutting and reinforcing cleavages, and largely defines the setup of a party system: political platforms, the behavior of individual parties, and the potential for forming coalitions. The specific resolution of these conflicts, especially since the beginning of the 19 th century, has led to the formation of diverse party systems in Europe.
In many countries, certain cleavage structures within party systems were 'frozen' in the 1920s
and have partially endured until today. Lipset and Rokkan distinguish four social cleavages against the background of two revolutions. Two cleavages (centre/periphery, religious/secular) are products of the national revolution, two others of the industrial revolution (urban/rural, capital/labour).
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The structure of parties and party systems, the way parties reflect real social conflicts, tells us a lot about the political systems in general. Moreover, the ability to democratize polities or to enhance democratic consolidation hinges to a large extent on the way people are politically mobilized and interests are articulated. The nexus between social cleavages and particized, political cleavages is the establishment of a linkage or a rooting of parties via the mobilization of large social groups. This article focuses on critical junctures prior to and during "national revolutions" and/or processes of democratization and/or re-democratization when political parties are able and willing to articulate and represent the common aspirations of huge parts of the populace.
Where parties mobilized masses along social cleavages, these divides were politicized for a very long time, in many cases until today. This has provided political parties with a specific rootedness. The establishment of such a linkage was and is prevented in the Philippines by political elites that are to a large extent based on family ties; in Thailand by elites of the bureaucratic polity, later by strongmen based in their constituencies and in the national parliament in factions (phuak).
The Enduring, but Weakened Power of Cleavages in Indonesia
With reference to this approach it is reasonable to look at two critical junctures in Indonesia because during these periods of time the role of agency was especially high. The first was during colonialism when some of the major parties were established in the 1910s and 1920s.
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The second decisive period was after the fall of Suharto in May 1998. The center-periphery divide could be seen in the conflict between those parties based on Java 9 The parties that emerged after 1945 reflected to a large extent the organizational and cleavage patterns that were established in the 1910s and 1920s. 10 To be sure, there were other events that had a lasting impact on the evolution of the Indonesian party system.
The first time parties were legally established was after World War II, but most parties at that time had prewar predecessors and were the products of the mass mobilization beforehand. In the early 1970s, the forcefully constructed new party system was essentially stabilized by repression. 
The Transformation of Predominant Cleavages in Malaysia
If we look at the current party system in Malaysia, we can also identify two critical junctures:
the first in the period immediately after the Second World War until the early 1950s when most parties were founded ahead of national independence; the second in the wake of the to safeguard its hegemony, a part of the opposition wants to transcend the fixation on these primordial cleavages and promote multi-religious and multi-ethnic cooperation.
A History of Non-Translation in the Philippines
In the Philippines, the way was paved for a clientelist two-party-system immediately after 58 Another factor that furthered personalism was the write-in system, whereby voters had to write in candidates' names on the ballot paper. This write-in ballot was ended by automated elections in 2010.
Carl H. Landé, Post-Marcos Politics: A Geographical and Statistical Analysis of the 1992 Presidential
Elections (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), p. 148.
or Aquino) or between "populism" and "reformism." 60 But these divides are hardly reflected in the structure of the party system. It would be difficult to name, for example, a "reformism party," especially not one that is not predominantly clientelist in nature. With respect to interparty competition, the only consistent predictor in the 2004 legislative election was centerperiphery. Lakas and supporters of the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) were more likely to come from the periphery, whereas voters of the Liberal Party came often from the National Capital Region. 61 All in all, the translation of social cleavages is very feeble.
Recurrent Attempts at Translation in Thailand
The cleavage approach is more relevant in Thailand than in the Philippines, but with clear limits. There are politicized conflicts between urban and rural interests, and between regions (the south and northwestern part of the country as heartlands of different parties), as well as economic cleavages (urban middle class versus peasants and urban lower class), but the party system remains fluid.
The party system has constantly shifted and parties have not been able to develop stable and deep-rooted organizational structures (with the Democrat Party as a partial exception). leftist and right-wing parties. This cleavage was reinforced by a center-periphery conflict since parties of the left generally succeeded in the Northeast. General Prem, prime minister from 1980-88, allowed political parties to take over some responsibilities in a system conveniently described as semi-democratic. 66 But due to suppression and a lack of financing, leftist parties were again marginalized in the 1980s and 1990s. After a coup in 1991, the crackdown of street protests, and the democratization in 1992, the two elections that same year brought to surface a new cleavage between "angels" and "devils," that is between parties that were somehow involved in the demonstrations or had backed the military, respectively. 1997 introduced a mixed-member system with 400 single-seat constituencies and 100 national party list seats.
The senate was elected through single non-transferable vote, and candidates were not allowed to be party members. The powers of the prime minister relative to the party faction were increased because cabinet members had to give up their seats upon joining the cabinet, and candidates had to be members of a party for at least 90 days if they wanted to run in an election. The prime minister had the power to dissolve the parliament and to call new elections, and thus to exclude factional rivals. 
Concluding Remarks
Parties and party systems are essentially clientelist in nature or are based on cleavages. In Indonesia in the 1950s, and less after 1998, as well as in Malaysia since independence, party systems have been cleavage-based, whereas the Philippines displays an example of a clientelist party system in which social cleavages are hardly translated. Thailand's party system represented at times cleavages, but has been all in all also essentially clientelist in nature.
In general, cleavage-based party systems tend to be more stable and to produce a better representativeness of government. But this presupposes that parties accept the democratic rules of the game. In Indonesia, for example, the first democracy in the 1950s failed due to deepening cleavages and a strong polarization within the party system. Since 1998, weaker cleavages appear to have stabilized the party system and led to a fragile democracy, yet party dealignment may slowly undermine the established pattern of party politics. The Malaysian In the Philippines, the lack of a clear translation of cleavages into the party system has hindered the political representation of large parts of the populace. This has contributed to the elitist form of politics, and, arguably, to the deteriorating quality of democracy. Although the Thai party system was at times characterized by steep cleavages, the institutionalization of the whole party system and of most single parties has been weak, so that cleavage structures were never consistently particized. In general, the fluid party system never allowed for the building of long-lasting linkages between parties and citizens. The weakness of parties has strengthened the old elites of the "bureaucratic polity" and the new businessmen alike, and it accounts for the current deadlock in Thai politics. In such clientelist systems, populist leaders such as Thaksin in Thailand or Estrada in the Philippines have more opportunities to build new parties and elite networks from scratch.
The political trajectories of most Southeast Asian countries have hindered the development of stable party traditions and strong linkages between voters and parties. The "freezing" of cleavages and party system structures thus has been impeded in most countries, but this does not sufficiently explain the differences between the party systems.
Certain institutional factors such as proportional elections and party and electoral laws that support party institutionalization tend to facilitate cleavage translation. In contrast, the presidency, which is strengthened by discretionary funds and single-member districts (both in the Philippines), the lack of rules against party-hopping, etc., have had a negative impact on the translation of social cleavages. Yet, the interplay of these factors is highly complex, and institutional reforms, for example, can have unintended consequences because of a shifting social and party political context. Institutional factors, thus, do not sufficiently explain the difference between the four countries.
How social cleavages are translated into political ones seems to be more important.
Translation is conceived of here as primarily the result of mass mobilization and linkage building between political parties (and often mass organization close to these parties) and the electorate. During the first critical juncture (i.e. during the first wave of party formation), the chances to establish rooted parties were good because ideologies such as nationalism, communism and political Islam were so popular and promising that large groups of people could be mobilized. In Europe, this was the time of mass-based parties, and the "end of ideology"
was not yet in sight. A translation model has to consider the relation between civil society, political parties, and administrative, military, aristocratic and business elites. In Indonesia, these elites were weak during critical junctures, so civil society and party politicians have been able to determine the rules of the game. In Malaysia, the colonial government transferred political power towards the administrative and aristocratic elite (the "administocrats") that used UMNO as their main vehicle. Moreover, the Chinese business elites decided to build the MCA and to cooperate with UMNO in order to stabilize their fragile political position. In the Philippines, the traditional oligarchs captured political parties and the state early on. In Thailand, the elites of the "bureaucratic polity" prevented parties from organizing effectively. It is, thus, crucial that parties are not fractionalized by locally/regionally based strongmen that build powerful groups and undermine these parties via family bonds (Philippines) or as clientelist factions (Thailand).
But it is not only the early mobilization that is decisive for the development of the party system, since at later critical junctures the electorate may also be politicized, such as in 
